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BOOKS REVIEWED
Abortion in a Changing World (2 vols.). Edited by Robert E. Hall, M.D.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. Pp. 377; 220. $10.00 per volume.
These two volumes are the result of a conference conducted in November
1968 attended by eighty-seven participants from nineteen different countries.
Although the conference was convened by the Association for the Study of
Abortion, the preface to these two volumes claims that the purpose of the conference and of these two volumes was not to "promote abortion law reform."'
Although not every reader of these two volumes will agree with this disclaimer, all readers must admit that these documents contain an enormous
amount of information. That information is gathered under the "ethical, medical, legal, social, and global aspects of abortion."- The first of these volumes
contains some forty essays gathered from the material of the five plenary
sessions of the conference; the second volume contains the record of ten separate panel sessions-recording a not infrequently disjointed dialogue concerning the vast implications of abortion.
It may be that no reader of a particular professional class, such as a moral
theologian, jurist, or obstetrician, will be very satisfied with the material in
these two volumes. The volumes present material which is somewhat familiar to
anyone who has studied even a little in the area of abortion, morality and the
law.
Moral theologians and jurists anxious to learn more about the implications
of abortion for their particular speciality will in general be disappointed by
this work. Some moral and theological problems related to abortion are covered
in forty-two pages of the first volume 3 Doctor Joseph F. Fletcher presents
what is described as "a Protestant minister's view." 4 Unfortunately, Dr.
Fletcher's convictions in this area do not reflect or even refer to the many
distinguished Protestant theologians who are opposed on moral grounds to
abortion. These Protestant theologians include Professor George H. Williams
of the Harvard Divinity School, Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Dr. Paul
Ramsey of Princeton Theological Seminary, and Dr. James M. Gustafson of
Yale Divinity School.
Unfortunately, the twelve pages5 devoted to what is called a "traditional"
and a "liberal" Catholic's view of abortion hardly begin to touch the profound
implications of this subject. 6 Some observers of these two volumes may in fact
infer that the editor, Dr. Robert Hall, may be operating on the supposition that
1.
cited
2.
3.

Hall, Preface to 1 Abortion in a Changing World v (R. Hall ed. 1970) [hereinafter
by volume as Hall].
Id.
1 Hall 3-45.

4. Id. at 25-29.
S. Id. at 34-45.
6. For example, these implications are developed in Williams, Religious Residues and
Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion, 31 Theological Studies, March, 1970,
at 10.
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only Roman Catholics-and only some of them-are opposed on moral grounds
to abortion.
Jurists will probably be as disappointed in these two volumes as are moral
theologians. The case for the withdrawal of all criminal sanctions from the area
of abortion is made by several commentators in this volume. Many of these
observers simply dismiss or disregard the moral and ethical position of those
who hold that the civil and criminal law of any civilized country should protect
the viable fetus as well as any human being who would continue to live unless
direct means were taken to annihilate its life.
The only real attempt in these volumes to justify the continuation of legal
prohibitions of abortion is made by Father Daniel Granfield, 7 the author of a
volume on abortion and the law.8 Unfortunately, Father Granfield is severely
limited in the amount of space available to him. He concedes that present laws
against abortion "have not solved our sociomedical abortion crisis."9 He goes
on to admit that abortion is a particularly difficult area to control by legal
means, and that we simply do not know "how badly the present laws function
in preventing illegal abortions or how well any moderate liberalization would
succeed in so doing."'1
Father Granfield would seem to be vulnerable in his assertion, without supporting evidence, that "[t]raditional law, even though enforced with difficulty,
obviously keeps down the number of legal abortions."'" Even if, however, this
supposition could be demonstrated with empirical evidence, the person who is
opposed to abortion on moral grounds must confront the further question
whether he has the right, as a member of a minority or of the majority, to
impose his particular moral views in this area on the vast millions of people in
America who do not in fact feel that there is anything immoral in an abortion
if a mother decides that the termination of a pregnancy is the least unsatisfactory way of resolving her problem.
Father Granfield admits, of course, that "[t]he Catholic is free to make up
his mind about abortion laws, their existence and their content." 2 Father
Granfield continues that for the Catholic "as for all citizens, the justification
of a criminal law is found in the need of the community to protect individuals
and the whole society against harm."'13
If this case on behalf of the retention of abortion laws seems less than conclusive, it must be said in all fairness that the advocates of total repeal are
also very deficient in the probative evidence which they offer for their position.
All that one can conclude about the present state of the question concerning
abortion and the law from these two volumes is that really no new knowledge
about this complex subject is being generated. At least no new resolution of
the problem, which would take account of its moral, medical and other aspects,
7. 1 Hall 149-56.
8. D. Granfield, The Abortion Decision (1969).
9. 1 Hall 154.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 155.
13. Id.

1971]

BOOKS REVIEWED

is even being offered much less accepted. The second volume under review is
particularly depressing in that all of the specialists seem to be talking along
parallel lines that never meet.
From this international conference on abortion, the information, statistics
and insights necessary for some moral consensus on this subject, at least in
the Western world, might have emerged. Unfortunately, this does not appear
to have happened. Perhaps the failure of such a moral consemsus to emerge is
attributable to the fact that the conferees, like so many people involved in the
discussion of abortion, are unable or unwilling to confront the terribly difficult
choice of exalting all human life, including viable fetal life, above every objective less than human life itself. The adoption of such an attitude calls for a
reordering of priorities and the suppression of any concept of expediency or
utilitarianism which would justify the termination of a fetal life in the name of
some human objective, such as the convenience of the mother or of the family,
or some other highly desirable objective which is less than the preservation of
life.
For persons who are seeking to become thoroughly familiar with the actual
background underlying the controversy over abortion and the law, these two
volumes may offer additional information. For persons who are seeking a clear,
comprehensive and in-depth study of the other ethical and theological implications of abortion, these volumes will have limited value.
ROBERT F. DiUNAN, SJ.*

The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives.
Edited by
John T. Noonan, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1970. Pp. xvii, 276.

$8.95.
Few subjects are as loaded with emotionalism as the intentional direct termination of pregnancy. In medical, legal, educational and political circles ferment over
various aspects of the abortion question has been continuing at an extremely
excited pace for a decade. For some it is primarily a legal issue, for others it is a
medical issue, a social issue, or strictly a matter of private concern. However, one
cannot avoid the conclusion that, at heart, it is a moral issue. I do not use the
term moral in the sense of denominational theology but in the sense that the
decision making process must be rooted in the most basic values of society. When
should society prohibit or permit abortion? What are the outer limits of acceptable medical practice? Which value considerations are supreme and which are
subordinate? Each of these questions is ultimately answered on the basis of some
moral judgment. Any answer given reflects some moral perspective. The Morality
of Abortion is a valuable collection of essays simply because seven highly qualified
contributors were brought together to consider the abortion question from the
moral point of view.
The editor, Professor Noonan, makes clear in his introduction that he will not
* United States Congressman (D. Mass.); former Dean, Boston College Law SchooL
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be diverted by the many false issues which have been introduced into the abortion
discussion in recent years. He puts the issue in terms of the most fundamental of
all values in our law and secular ethics-the right to life:
[S]imple coexistence with other humans demands that the lives of some not be open
to sacrifice for the welfare and convenience of others. .

.

.One person's freedom to

obtain an abortion is the denial of another person's right to live.
To answer that the fetus is not human is to join issue. Proponents of abortion, for
the most part, have not cared to make this contact with their opponents. .

.

.They

are content to bypass what strikes them as fruitless speculation of a metaphysical
sort. The relativity of morals, the subjectivity of knowledge, the lack of agreement on
ethical principle, all these cautionary epistemological axioms, are deployed to turn
off discussion of abortion by those who pronounce with conviction on the morality of
war, the rights of conscientious objectors, and the wrong of capital punishment. In
not responding when the question of humanity is raised in relation to abortion, they
make their own decision as to who is human. "How long can a man turn his head and
pretend that he just doesn't see?"'
Professor John T. Noonan, Jr. of the University of California School of Law
at Berkeley, the editor of this volume, is the author of the first essay, An Almost
Absolute Value in History.In a brilliant analysis Noonan takes his reader through
the evolution of Greek thought on abortion, the influence of the early JudeoChristian ethic, the writings of the Fathers, medieval legal and theological views,
the opinions of the casuists, papal legislation and rulings, theories of ensoulment,
modern theological views and a discussion of exceptions to the prohibition on
abortion. Proponents of indiscriminate abortion may attempt to dismiss this as
Christian historical theorizing, but Noonan's presentation leaves the reader with
the conviction that there are substantial legal reasons behind these historical
developments which vitally affect the modern abortion decision:
The most fundamental question involved in the long history of thought on abortion
is: How do you determine the humanity of a being? ...
Any attempt to limit humanity to exclude some group runs the risk of furnishing authority and precedent for excluding other groups in the name of the consciousness or perception of the controlling group in the society.
[H]uman beings with equal rights often come in conflict with each other, and
some decision must be made as [sic] whose claims are to prevail. Cases of conflict
involving the fetus are different only in two respects: the total inability of the fetus
to speak for itself 2and the fact that the right of the fetus regularly at stake is the
right to life itself.
These are the lessons of history and no society can completely ignore them.
The second essay is by Paul Ramsey, Professor of Christian Ethics at Princeton
University. He begins with the premise that religion is not irrelevant to the
discussion of the law of abortion. I find Professor Ramsey's reasoning somewhat
strained on this point. He suggests that decisions such as United States v. Seeger,8
1.
1970)
2.
3.

The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives xvii (J.Noonan ed.
[hereinafter cited as Noonan].
Noonan 51-57.
380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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and MacMurray v. United States,4 indicate the proposition that "any of the
positions taken on controversial public questions [have] profound moral and
human or value implications [that] hold for us the functional sanctity of religious
belief." 5 This may be true in a situation where a statute requires a particular
kind of moral test, but as a general proposition it has no legal support.
Ramsey's essay takes the simple distinction between sin and crime and briefly
uses it to deal with the problem of legislating morality. He presents the person
who believes that abortion is unjustified killing and the person who believes that
it is immoral to prohibit abortion. He then asks if either of these persons "[c] ould
. . . for purposes of jurisprudence suspend that conscience enough to open his
mind to the greater desirability.. . of other possible solutions that should be
admitted to the public debate? Ought each of these persons do this?"6 These are
important questions in the context of the current debate over abortion law and I
would like to have seen Ramsey pursue them more deeply.
What Ramsey does do, however, is present a well balanced case for the unborn
child. His analysis shows that in modern medicine and biology it is increasingly
difficult to distinguish between the unborn child and the child after birth. The
moral and legal implications of this fact are of great importance:
In the future we are going to have to face the fact that the fetus can be made a man
among men by much earlier incubator methods, and can in any case be treated as a
patient while in utero like any other person. We are morally ili-prepared for this
situation. It is possible for the practice of medicine governed only by an undifferentiated resolve to save life to create as many problems by its interventions upon
life in the first of it as have been created by the undifferentiated resolve to save life
in the last of it.. . . Between these two, the middle ground of the justifiability of
allowing to die and the unjustifiability of taking human life needs to be restored.?
Professor James M. Gustafson of Yale University writes of A ProtestantEthical Approach. Professor Gustafson, as with so many writers on this subject, feels
compelled to first examine Roman Catholic views on the subject. Many of us
who have been involved in this debate for some time are tired of having every
perspective of abortion set off by the framework of Roman Catholic views. With
this behind him, Gustafson goes to work with the abortion decision in the most
difficult of possible contexts-the choice of a single human being, a rape victim
whose condition is complicated by severe social and medical problems.
Lawyers may believe that hard cases make bad law, but I suspect the moralist
is correct in examining the problem of human choice from the perspective of
difficult choices simply because the most difficult choice illuminates the darkest
corners of the process by which we as human beings make moral choices. Gustafson is not concerned with the juridical requirement but with the problem of choice
confronted by the human person. He would allow the abortion in this case. In
doing so he emphasizes the "position of the persons who must assume responsibility for the decision ... ."8 Gustafson concludes that: "As the morally consci4. 330 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1964).
5.

Noonan 61.

6.

Id. at 64.

7. Id. at 99-100.
8. Id. at 119.
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entious soldier fighting in a particular war is convinced that life can and ought to
be taken, 'justly' but also 'mournfully,' so the moralist can be convinced that
the life of the defenseless fetus can be taken, less justly, but more mournfully." D
Bernard Haring, Professor of Moral Theology at Accadimia Alfonsiana
(Rome) attempts to approach abortion within the context of Roman Catholic
tradition. His essay does not present the Catholic view, but one Catholic view.
Haring is correct in saying that the theme common to all Catholic views on
abortion is the "belief in the dignity of each human being, created to the image
and likeness of God, and in man's calling to universal brotherhood in mutual love,
respect, and justice."'1° It should be made dear, however, that not every Roman
Catholic who addresses himself to the abortion question is speaking exclusively
from this context. Because a person accepts certain theological principles does
not mean that he finds it impossible to examine the subject from the viewpoint
of legal or medical or social standards. Failure to appreciate this has often resulted
in confusion and undue emotionalism in the current debate on the law of abortion.
Professor Haring's essay makes a valuable contribution to this book. His brief
discussion of fetal biology makes clear that whether the life is a human person or
not, it is at least an individuum from twenty days after conception onward. He
stresses the obvious difference between contraception and abortion, a distinction
which badly needs restatement to the general public. Finally, Haring makes a
plea for legislation which will respect the moral sensitivity of medical personnel
who do not wish to participate in the termination of pregnancy. He specifically
is critical of the Abortion Act passed in the United Kingdom in 1967, because it
does not recognize conscientious objection in certain types of abortion procedures.
Professor George Huntston Williams of Harvard University has written an
essay titled The Sacred Condominium. Williams draws his usage of the term
condominium from feudal law; it was the joint rule of two sovereigns over a
given territory. He suggests that the concept has value for abortion inasmuch as
"[b]oth progenitor and state have their proper responsibility for the nurture and
tutelage of the child and consequently their own proper authority in the preservation of its life."" Williams believes that such a condominium of responsibility
12
exists over the lives of unborn children in the "social constitution of our nation
even apart from theistic considerations. Some of the ideas propounded by Williams
will have little meaning for those trained in law; an example is his description
of a fetus as a "protoperson." However, his concept of a condominium of responsibility for the life of an unborn child seems to me to be a most lawyer-like way
of approaching a legal problem which currently seems mired in a muddy base of
emotionalism. This is the problem of how the law can meet the social needs
reflected in the current demand for abortion on request while still insuring due
process to the unborn child.
How would the effective use of the condominium function in a conflict of rights
situation? Williams sees the responsibility of the progenitors as an accountability
which flows from their consent to the sexual act. He calls for legal and moral
9.

Id. at 122 (footnote omitted).

10. Id. at 126.
11.
12.

Id. at 152.
Id. at 153.
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codes based on this responsibility. Williams suggests that this requires an involvement of professionals in the abortion decision; the decision cannot be left solely
to private choice. He discusses the possible role of lawyers, sociopsychiatrists,
clergy and physicians in what he calls the "condominal court." Wlliams would
allow abortion when pregnancy results from rape, there being no consent by the
female progenitor. He would also allow abortion when the pregnancy is caused by
incest on the grounds that the interest of society in preserving the integrity of
the family is of the highest order. He allows abortion in a case of adulterous pregthat this is "for the husband the nearest equivalent of rape for
nancy, writing
13
the woman."
I am disturbed when Williams suggests that "the state would release full
authority to the mother or the two parents"'1 4 when it has been determined beyond doubt that the unborn child is seriously mentally or physically defective.
It seems to me that the state has the highest duty to protect each person's right
to life from arbitrarydeprivation and that nothing could be more arbitrary than
depriving a person of life on grounds that he is defective.
I want to stress that Professor Williams' approach strikes me as forming a
basis for an intelligent and constitutional solution to the problem of what legislative enactment should be applied to abortion.
John M. Finnis, Professor of Law at Oxford, presents an analysis of the three
most commonly proposed legislative schemes for abortion. These are: prohibition
of all except therapeutic abortion, permitting abortion only on medical grounds,
and the legalization of all hospital abortions. He relates these schemes to various
values which the penal law should achieve. Finnis concludes that "[t]he most
popular schemes in current discussion happen to be compromises that muddle
together aims and elements of all three model schemes. . . ."" Finnis asks that
we begin as a civilization to clarify the ends we seek and relate these ends to the
law. This is a more effective means to rational legislation on abortion than the
use of compromise which now dominates the adoption of legislation on abortion.
The problem with this proposal by Professor Finnis is that it relates to a world
which doesn't exist. Legislatures do not deal in absolutes and I fear that this
approach will have little impact on the reality of the legislative process.
The essay by Professors David Louisell and John T. Noonan, Jr., of the
Berkeley Law School faculty examines the abortion problem from the perspective
of constitutional law. To a lawyer this is the heart of the book. It begins with a
discussion of the legal status of the unborn child. In summary form the authors
examine the treatment accorded to fetal life in the law of property,, the law of
crimes, and tort law. This is familiar territory to anyone who has read widely in
the literature, but it is worthy of the restatement it receives here simply because
the sense of fair play toward unborn children reflected in our legal traditions has
not been given in-depth consideration in the popular media.
Noonan and Louisell present an excellent discussion of the constitutionality of
legal regulation of abortion. The authors reject the now-popular idea that abor13. Id. at 167.
14. Id. at 166.
15. Id. at 207.
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Under Griswold v. ConnecticutV the

constitutionality of a state's intrusion into the private sexual relations between a
husband and wife was questioned. But the relevance of Griswold to abortion statutes is doubtful if one considers the essential difference between contraception
and abortion. The state's interest in protecting the life of the unborn child would
seem sufficient reason to justify a state's regulation of abortion.
The most interesting part of the Noonan-Louisell essay is titled The Constitutionality of Not Protectingthe Embryo. The authors argue that:
It seems fair to conclude that the new abortion statutes come not as a further evolutionary step in the law's perception of the value, intrinsic dignity, and essential
equality of human life. To the contrary, they confront the law's evolution with a
countermovement. The unborn child, concededly morally blameless, may be sacrificed
in the interest of the mother's mental health or the social interest in avoiding a
defective person who might become a welfare charge, because those interests by the
ethos of the day are regarded as more socially significant than the claim to life. The
right to life becomes relative not only to others' right to life, but to others' health,
happiness, convenience, and desires for freedom from avoidable burdens. The scalesmaster is to be not a neutral agent such as a court, but the person who desires to
avoid the burden.' s
I recommend this volume as an intelligent and thoughtful contribution to a
confused debate.
CHARLES P. KINDREGAN*

The Price of Dependency: Civil Liberties in the Welfare State. By Robert
M. O'Neil. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co. 1970. Pp. 351. $8.95.
The American people have benefited greatly from the plethora of social programs enacted by federal and state governments in the past several decades.
Notwithstanding numerous justified criticisms, these programs have succeeded
in ameliorating our most desperate needs in housing, welfare, education and concomitantly, as the bureaucracies swelled, employment. A disturbing consequence
of this social legislation, unnoticed until recent years, has been the expanding
encroachment by governmental agencies upon the liberties of the recipients of
government largess.
In writing The Price of Dependency, Robert M. O'Neil has done us a great
service by documenting the anti-libertarian measures frequently resorted to by
government to professedly guard the integrity of its social creations. The governmental controls he describes typically take the form of restrictions upon the
16. See Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Babbitz v. McCann,
310 F. Supp. 293, 299 (ED. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v.
Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969), probable jurisdiction postponed to hearing
on the merits, 397 U.S. 1061 (1970); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P.2d 194,
199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. Noonan 254.
* Assodate Professor of Law, Suffolk University.
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beneficiaries' right to receive or use a benefit in other than a prescribed fashion.1
As such, the right to the continued receipt of benefits is said to be "conditioned"
upon compliance with statutory and administrative regulations.
There is no doubt that these restrictions have often resulted in gross injustice.
Desperately poor children have been denied public assistance because their
mothers failed to meet the sexual mores of state welfare officials.2 Government
employees in non-sensitive positions have been discharged for insisting upon
the exercise of their constitutional freedoms. 3 Until very recently,4 recipients
of all types of largess have been denied the most fundamental procedural protections when the government acted.
Yet it is too facile to simply advocate the removal of all controls, for government has a mandated responsibility to safeguard the interests of the national
community. Having once appreciated the general nature of the problem, each
variety of benefit must be separately examined to see if the restrictions associated with the program so infringe upon the substantive or procedural rights of the
individual beneficiary as to make them legally impermissible. This is undoubtedly a formidable task-given the highly complex legal, social and political
questions which are inextricably involved in the implementation of such vital
government programs and services. Yet the author here attempts just such an
analysis and it must be said he achieves it with a good degree of success.
Mr. O'Neil devotes the first two chapters5 to carefully defining and tracing
historically the legal problems of governmentally conditioned benefits. The Price
of Dependency consists for the most part of descriptions of the various governmental programs 6 (e.g., public housing, education and welfare) and a rather
complete account of the numerous restrictions imposed upon beneficiaries. 7 Besides discussing the cases challenging such restrictions, the author provides us
with some notion of the demoralizing and unsettling personal and social consequences which state controls foster.8 This information, which is both socially and
legally relevant, is conveyed by the comments of victimized beneficiaries, from
newspaper accounts,' 0 and from the analyses and conclusions of governmental
1. See R. O'Nei, The Price of Dependency: Civil Liberties in the Welfare State 29-38
(1970) [hereinafter cited as O'Neill.
2. O'Neil 280-84. See also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Graham, Civil Liberties
Problems in Welfare Administration, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 836, 905-10 (1968).
3. See generally O'Neil 58-114.
4. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process standards at welfare hearings) ; Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 US. 853 (1970) (due process standards at eviction hearings); Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale LJ. 733 (1964).
5. ONeil 13-57.
6. Id. at 115-55, 223-91.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., id. at 259-65 (the discussion of the means test for welfare eligibility).
9. See, e.g., id. at 97 (members of Peace Corps protesting government reprisals against
those Corps members who made antiwar statements); id. at 254 (comments of welfare
mother to Civil Rights Commission on the effects of AFDC requirements on martial sta-

bility).
10. See, e.g., id. at 224 (N.Y. Times report on public housing); id. at 25S (N.Y. Times
report on welfare).
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bodies." The result is a highly readable study which has the inevitable effect of
causing the reader to be greatly disturbed at the loss of our liberties.
One must criticize some of the technical aspects of this book. While the
author probably didn't intend to provide an in-depth legal analysis of the
problems of conditioned benefits, he did venture into many of the legal issues
involved.' 2 Having opened the door, it is incumbent upon him to provide the
reader with the materials necessary for deliberate legal scrutiny. Unfortunately,
he doesn't. Too often the reader is told only of a court's conclusion and is left
speculating as to the rationale behind it.
Attorneys who are interested in expanding their knowledge of the law surrounding government restriction of social programs may well find this book
inadequate and frustrating. If, however, Mr. O'Neil was not attempting to
produce an analytical work for the benefit of the legal profession, but rather a
call to the American people to beware of the loss of their freedoms from overly
restrictive government, he has surely achieved his end.

NEiL H. MICXIENBERG*

Military Justice Is To Justice As Military Music Is To Music. By Robert
Sherrill. New York: Harper & Row. 1970. Pp. 234. $6.95.
Major General Kenneth J. Hodson, the Army's Judge Advocate General,
recently observed that "[i]t's become very popular to be critical of anything
military, whether it's military music... or military justice."' It's not a difficult
guess that, when the head of the Army's 1,900 man military law firm made
that statement, he did not have Robert Sherrill's penetrating new book far
from mind. Had he read the book, however, he would have known that military
music fares reasonably well, the only reference to it being contained in the
title, an old remark usually attributed to Clemenceau. Instead Robert Sherrill's
book is a first-rate, in-depth critique of what the Army considers a system of
justice "as good or better than the justice in 48 of the 50 states.'"2 If the
Army's claim is true, the reader will be outraged by the thought that criminal
defendants in 48 of the 50 states fare worse than did "the Presidio 27," a
group of soldiers charged with mutiny and court-martialed for breaking formation at a stockade work lineup, for singing songs and demanding to see lawyers
and the press, and to have an audience with the stockade commandant.'
11. See, e.g., id. at 227, 240, 261 (excerpts from the Report of the President's Commission on Civil Disorders).
12. See, e.g., id. at 47-57 (constitutionality of conditioned benefits); id. at 156-94 (the
college and the Constitution) ; id. at 251-91 (public welfare and private rights).
* Instructor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
1. Newsweek, Aug. 31, 1970, at 22.
2. Id.
3. R. Sherrill, Military Justice Is To Justice as Military Music Is To Music, 4-62 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Sherrill].
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The Presidio "mutiny" is one of three major incidents about which Sherrill,
the Washington editor of The Nation, has structured his analysis of military
justice and military prisons. The other two are the widely reported court-martial
of Captain Howard Levy in 1967 for disobeying an order to give medical
training to Special Forces troops,4 and the conviction in 1965 of Second Lieutenant Henry Howe, Jr. for using contemptuous language against President Lyndon
B. Johnson.5
Sherrill does not purport to have written an objective, scholarly analysis of
the cases and conditions discussed, and he has not done so. His is a partisan
book-at times irritatingly so, as when he writes that Colonel Earl Brown, the
military judge in the Levy case, was sent down from Washington "to steer
the Levy court-martial successfully to its conclusion." In fact, Brown was
selected because he was one of the Army's best, not one of its most prejudiced.
Others were far better suited for the role of hanging judge. Still, as a book
designed to arouse the public over what Sherrill considers to be the unconstitutional trial procedures and inhumane punisbment that hang over the heads of
the 3.8 million men currently in uniform, it is far from unpersuasive.
Especially moving is a chapter describing conditions and treatment in military
stockades, a narrative which lives up to its title, "The Final Degradation."
Reports of brutality and attempted suicides abound. Among the stories is the
one of "Army officers at Fort Riley, Kansas, who panicked when they discovered
one of their soldiers was only twelve years old and 'hid' him for three months in
solitary confinement; of the Marines forced to strip to the waist and roll in fresh
feces ... and of the soldiers at Ft. Dix, New Jersey, who were sprayed with
water and then pushed out into wintry weather, naked, for varying lengths of
time."7

The book has been carefully researched, Sherrill having interviewed the participants and read the trial records of most of the incidents discussed. For
example, biographical sketches are supplied for approximately half of the Presidio 27 to support Sherrill's thesis that each was unfit for military service and
none should have been taken in the first place. He also discloses, in discussing
the Howe case, that the only reason Howe was recognized as a serviceman and
detained at the anti-war demonstration in El Paso, Texas, was that a filling
station attendant, where Howe had stopped to ask directions, noticed an Army
sticker on the car and the anti-Johnson poster in the back seat and telephoned
the Military Police at nearby Fort Bliss. The provost marshal at Bliss, who had
previous experiences with Howe, dispatched a few "observers" to watch Howe's
participation in the demonstration.8 This bit of evidence was buried in the pretrial papers in Howe's case. It was never developed at the trial but was men4. United States v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672 (1968), petition for review denied, 18 US.C.M.A.

627 (1969).
S. United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.MA. 165, 37 CM".R. 429 (1967). The reviewer was
military appellate defense counsel in this case.
6. Sherrll 123.
7. Id. at 192.

8. Id. at 178-80.
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tioned in oral argument on appeal before the Court of Military Appeals.
Sherrill did his homework to learn of such details.
Nevertheless, inaccuracies persist. Much is made in the book over "the Army's
record of getting convictions in 95 percent of all courts-martial,"" thereby
supposedly illustrating the certainty of conviction and the sham procedures of
military justice. No mention is made that the vast majority of all courts-martial consist of guilty pleas, undoubtedly popular in the military because the
defendant bargains for a sentence which sets the maximum penalty to which he
will be subject. If the court-martial decrees a harsher sentence, the convening
authority must reduce the sentence so that it does not exceed the bargained
maximum. However, should the military jury levy a sentence less than that for
which the accused bargained, the defendant "beats the deal." With such an
incentive for the guilty plea, great care is necessary to insure that the innocent
do not plead guilty. Military judges, it should be added, in fact do a commendable job in ferreting out the insincere plea, if for no other reason than the
threat of reversal by the Court of Military Appeals.
A more basic error appears in the discussion of article 88 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, the article under which Henry Howe was convicted for using
contemptuous words against President Johnson. As examples of the potential
sweep of article 88, Sherrill reports that "servicemen anywhere can be punished
for calling House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mendel Rivers a drunk
... or Senator Thomas Dodd and Congressman Adam Clayton Powell cheats
.... 2lo In fact, article 88 humbles not all servicemen but only commissioned
officers and, as relates to the examples discussed, only insofar as they use contemptuous words against Congress as a body-not individual Congressmen. 1 '
The article is onerous enough without it being made to appear more so.
Every so often a military trial of notoriety is held and headlines are made in
newspapers across the country. Such was the case when Captain Levy was courtmartialed, and Lieutenant Calley's present trial for his alleged role in the My
Lai massacre seems sure to be a new public sensation. After the court-martial is
over the issues of military justice are generally forgotten until the next prominent case appears. Certainly anyone who reads Sherrill's book will appreciate
the forces at work in a military trial and will sympathize with servicemen so
unfortunate as to have spent even one day in a military stockade. They will
surely question, as does Sherrill, whether the only way to truly reform military
justice might not be to take away from the military the judicial process and
return jurisdiction to the civilian courts.
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